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Global Offices. Locations Search. Search for a Ryder location In effect, the policy maker sees herself not as manipulating market actors but as nullifying existing manipulations.

Nudge theorists claim they are giving agents avenues to make better choices that agents truly wish to make. How nudge theorists are supposed to know agents wish to make the choices nudge theorists wish them to make is typically explained using anecdotes.

Regardless, the implication of nudge theory is that the agent learning mechanism is broken or needs a helping hand. Nudge theorists recognize on some level that instead of optimizing, agents rely on heuristics in order to make choices.

Altering the context in which the heuristics of choice operate can short-circuit choice to favor behaviors preferred by policy makers. By deviating from traditional optimization in creative ways, agents can lower the cost of making the combinatorially large number of decisions facing them at any particular moment.

Agents have different methods of making choices from which to choose. Some of these methods are for sale in the form of books, courses, and paid expertise, or granted in exchange for supporting an idea and its leaders, but many more can be gleaned from pure observation and trial-and-error.

Analogous to choosing which goods to consume, choosing a decision-making method depends strongly on the characteristics and subjective preferences of the agent.

Making it cheaper to engage in some methods of decision-making is analogous to subsidizing some goods. Gigerenzer, G. Simple heuristics that make us smart.

Hansen, P. Nudge and the manipulation of choice: A framework for the responsible use of the nudge approach to behaviour change in public policy.

Risk Reg. Simon, H. Cohen and M. Wartofsky, eds. Boston: D. Thaler, Richard, Sunstein, Cass. Yale University Press.

Yes, people do not search the neoclassical way. But people do search in other ways: they try to find new perspectives with which to look at old problems, they purposefully take risks to jolt themselves and their thinking out of their comfort zone, they divide their knowledge with new people and experts, they go to school to learn more about an area they believe will be fruitful to their entrepreneurial search, and so on.

Kirzner was right in that the neoclassical approach to understanding how entrepreneurs made profits from arbitrage was likely incorrect, as it presumed a calculable equilibrium that was within reach given enough search.

Fixed points of this sort are generally incalculable in complex social systems. But by stripping individuals of all possible deliberative heuristics of search, Kirzner missed an opportunity to talk about how entrepreneurs choose which heuristics to use in which contexts and what kinds of social institutions might have emerged to support this process of choice.

There may be no methodical way to produce useful novelty, or to even know when you should be trying to produce useful novelty, because you have no way of calculating whether your ends are better furthered by the employment of any particular novelty because you cannot conceive of it.

This is my first economics publication. You might recognize the review from an earlier blog post of mine, though the published review is more polished and detailed.

Social scientists, they say, have been raised on a strict diet of equilibrium theory and market failure. Those social scientists who accept the market failure hypothesis use equilibrium theory wielded by well-meaning apolitical interventionists as a panacea to all mixed-economic ills.

Those social scientists who do not accept the market failure hypothesis use equilibrium theory wielded by marginalist freedom-lovers as a panacea to all mixed-economic ills.

Colander and Kupers demarcate their position in this starkly painted landscape as strictly not one control or the other market anarchism , for methodological and practical reasons.

How it will change as an institution — how it is formed, what incentives must propel public choosers compared to now — is expressed somewhat in future parts of the book, but never satisfactorily, in my view.

What new things government should do to change social outcomes are elaborated on with greater detail. The complexity frame as set forth in the book is similar in every way to how social systems have been expressed as complex adaptive systems over the past 20 years especially.

Equilibrium theory is described as an inappropriate tool with which to investigate market behavior for many reasons, not the least of which is that equilibrium theory is a static theory in a reality of constant change.

The main takeaway is that trends, like the statistics we associate with macroeconomic variables, are generated from underlying, bottom-up processes.

As such, the authors claim, policy measures should strive to be as bottom-up as possible, to subvert or mimic natural social processes like shifts in norms.

For the most part, their methodological case is solid. Where they come in weak is in detailing the goals that bottom-up policy should strive towards.

Their choice of heroes and anti-heroes colors the book with an ideological tint that I believe obscures their overall message of bottom-up change.

Sadly, they fail to express how social welfare is supposed to be measured as a part of policy effectiveness accounting, and how the determination of social welfare itself might be colored by the ideology of the authors and, more importantly, the policy-makers.

Multiple equilibria and lock-in are the focus of their ensuing policy suggestions. The authors also rely heavily on game theoretical constructions, as a kind of panacea to traditional utility maximization equilibrium theorizing.

The problem with this being is that in general, finding a Nash equilibrium is an NP-hard problem. Norms are the primary target of nudges, the authors describe, but nudging is really about manipulating decision-making heuristics.

Often they choose based on some set of heuristics. In Parts 3 and 4, Colander and Kupers suggest that while governance structures are created from the bottom-up, these bottom-up structures are somehow free of the apparent behavioral flaws of the individuals whose decisions led to the emergence of these governance structures.

To suggest that one the private individual is driven by self-gain while the other the public chooser is driven by social welfare ignores how most governance structures have traditionally arose.

It also ignores the numerous non-governance organizations that arose to promote social welfare throughout history. They do not examine why fraternal and other charitable organizations vanished in the first place, instead leaning on their implicit assumption throughout the book of an almost Pigovian-like market failure theory of private lock-in due to suboptimal norms and individual decision-making heuristics.

More egregious than their academic oversights and ideological biases, however, is their waving-away of economic truths that are true regardless of the complexity of the social system.

The primary truth ignored is the recognition that resources arrogated to government have alternative uses in the private sphere.

How officials are able to calculate which methods will jolt society in which direction, and what the more optimal basin of attraction is, remains a mystery unexplained in this text.

I saw little indication of new theory in the book. Most of what I saw was an attempt to re-package Pigovian social welfare theory and utilitarianism in complex systems theoretical trappings.

I enjoyed the introduction of complexity ideas to the realm of public policy-making. My main problem with the text is that although it rejects the ideas of equilibrium theory and Pigovian welfare economics in a traditional sense it fully embraces them in a modern sense, without an acknowledgment of why rejection of one does not imply the rejection of both.

It discards in large part the power and insight of complex systems theory, and does not challenge the policy-making status quo nearly as heartily as it deserves.

For more on this, see my post. Standard macro theory is a linear aggregation of axiomatic math-based micro theory. Its descriptive power suffers from both its presumed linearity and its roots in axiomatic math.

But that might not be the real issue. The real issue may be that students are not instructed on how problematic a linear, axiomatic macro might be to the descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive powers of their models.

My question, on the back of Prof. The prevalence, indeed, the routine nature of nonlinearity and feedback effects in social dynamics would seem to preclude a linear aggregation of presumptive equilibriating micro states.

Given the likelihood of undecidabilities at more complex levels like the social level, standard macro methodology has two big strikes against it.

There are more strikes against standard macro methodology in the form of blatantly ignoring non-trivial fundamentalities of social systems, such that actors are not homogeneous and social networks matter, to name a few.

A con, that only works given fundamentally wrong assumptions about human behavior and emergent social behavior from the interaction of many individuals.

So, again: what would a conless macroeconomics look like? Methodological thinkers in economics usually translate decision theory as it pertains to economic decisions as choice theory, that is, rational choice theory.

Choice theory as the decision theory of economic individuals is widespread and almost never questioned by practitioners of the science. In their first and second year foundational courses graduate students are rarely exposed to caveats to traditional choice theory, except perhaps a chapter or two on Thalerian behavioral economics and the results of economic experiments of the type pioneered by Vernon Smith.

Real analysis is ever and always the formalism of choice theory and of the interactions between economic individuals. The edgiest of departures from midth century rational choice theory still rely on reliable heuristics, partial optimization, or alternative learning methods to arrive at decisions.

Note that much of my analysis draws from the discoveries of scientists working in the field of computational complexity. I will refer to a few here, but a general reading is encouraged.

The 20 th century crowd is comprised of mostly mathematicians and computer scientists, namely, Kurt Gödel, Alan Turing, Stephen Wolfram. Two of the spokespeople for the 21 st century crowd are the mathematical economist V.

Velupillai and the computer scientist Gregory Chaitin, though others and notably several Austrian economists have their head in this game. It is important to understand, going forward, that the social systems studied by economists are complex systems.

That is, in order to get an accurate solution to any given problem our model must be as complex as the economic process it is attempting to emulate.

The very reason we build models is to reduce a complex process into manageable parts; the PCE implies that complex-enough systems are not coherently reducible to some interacting set of component parts.

This feature of any complex-enough system is called computational irreducibility. Social systems are computationally irreducible.

The mathematics underlying real analysis are called axiomatic mathematics. Axiomatic mathematics takes a small set of axioms, then, by virtue of deduction, derives a large amount of implications.

Axiomatic mathematics relies on proof theory to conduct its derivations, and proof theory relies on the unbreakability of the law of the excluded middle LEM.

All derivations of mathematical realities are based on the unbreakability of the LEM. Any theory based on axiomatic mathematics wherein the LEM does not hold is called an inconsistent theory, in that the theory in some way contradicts itself.

The implications of inconsistent theories are unprovable, and their predictions, meaningless. In , Kurt Gödel, an Austrian mathematician who was friends with Oskar Morgenstern, proved that there exist true propositions that can be neither verified or falsified by axiomatic mathematics.

These propositions violate the law of the excluded middle. But it is true that the statement is false so says the statement itself.

That is, both the statement and its negation are true, and we have unearthed an inconsistency. Both comparative statics and general equilibrium theory have been shown to have pathological behavior, such that we are faced with either undecidable propositions, non-computability of solutions, or both.

Velupillai reviews the formal underpinnings of general equilibrium theory as formulated by Debreu and describes how, when faced with the need to depart from axiomatic mathematics and develop theories in the realm of constructive mathematics where the LEM does not hold and thus undecidabilities can be taken into account rigorously, several of the theorems that underlie the proof of existence of a general equilibrium as formulated by Debreu are invalid Velupillai, , p.

To put it more plainly, the axiom system of traditional mathematics is not sufficient to derive the existence of general equilibrium as formulated by Debreu.

Choice theory rests on several presumptions, a few of which are 1 existence, completeness, and transitivity of preferences, 2 revealed preferences, 3 the existence, continuity, and uniqueness of a utility relation between preferences and the set of the reals — that is, a cardinalization of the ordinal, complete, and transitive set of preferences.

Kreps, Given these assumptions, maxima in the case of individual utility and minima in the case of costs, exist, and are unique.

The completeness — or analytical closedness — of decision theory is a necessary condition for solutions to exist. An incomplete decision theory is one which contains undecidable propositions.

Choice theory and its conclusions are consistent only if its axioms hold, including the axiom whereby solutions maxima and minima are proved to exist, and to be unique.

Similarly, for social choice theory, equilibria must exist, and be unique. Morgenstern believed that game theory and its panoply of strategies might serve as a more rigorous replacement of comparative statics.

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Wartofsky, eds. Boston: D. Thaler, Richard, Sunstein, Cass. Yale University Press. Yes, people do not search the neoclassical way. But people do search in other ways: they try to find new perspectives with which to look at old problems, they purposefully take risks to jolt themselves and their thinking out of their comfort zone, they divide their knowledge with new people and experts, they go to school to learn more about an area they believe will be fruitful to their entrepreneurial search, and so on.

Kirzner was right in that the neoclassical approach to understanding how entrepreneurs made profits from arbitrage was likely incorrect, as it presumed a calculable equilibrium that was within reach given enough search.

Fixed points of this sort are generally incalculable in complex social systems. But by stripping individuals of all possible deliberative heuristics of search, Kirzner missed an opportunity to talk about how entrepreneurs choose which heuristics to use in which contexts and what kinds of social institutions might have emerged to support this process of choice.

There may be no methodical way to produce useful novelty, or to even know when you should be trying to produce useful novelty, because you have no way of calculating whether your ends are better furthered by the employment of any particular novelty because you cannot conceive of it.

This is my first economics publication. You might recognize the review from an earlier blog post of mine, though the published review is more polished and detailed.

Social scientists, they say, have been raised on a strict diet of equilibrium theory and market failure. Those social scientists who accept the market failure hypothesis use equilibrium theory wielded by well-meaning apolitical interventionists as a panacea to all mixed-economic ills.

Those social scientists who do not accept the market failure hypothesis use equilibrium theory wielded by marginalist freedom-lovers as a panacea to all mixed-economic ills.

Colander and Kupers demarcate their position in this starkly painted landscape as strictly not one control or the other market anarchism , for methodological and practical reasons.

How it will change as an institution — how it is formed, what incentives must propel public choosers compared to now — is expressed somewhat in future parts of the book, but never satisfactorily, in my view.

What new things government should do to change social outcomes are elaborated on with greater detail. The complexity frame as set forth in the book is similar in every way to how social systems have been expressed as complex adaptive systems over the past 20 years especially.

Equilibrium theory is described as an inappropriate tool with which to investigate market behavior for many reasons, not the least of which is that equilibrium theory is a static theory in a reality of constant change.

The main takeaway is that trends, like the statistics we associate with macroeconomic variables, are generated from underlying, bottom-up processes.

As such, the authors claim, policy measures should strive to be as bottom-up as possible, to subvert or mimic natural social processes like shifts in norms.

For the most part, their methodological case is solid. Where they come in weak is in detailing the goals that bottom-up policy should strive towards.

Their choice of heroes and anti-heroes colors the book with an ideological tint that I believe obscures their overall message of bottom-up change.

Sadly, they fail to express how social welfare is supposed to be measured as a part of policy effectiveness accounting, and how the determination of social welfare itself might be colored by the ideology of the authors and, more importantly, the policy-makers.

Multiple equilibria and lock-in are the focus of their ensuing policy suggestions. The authors also rely heavily on game theoretical constructions, as a kind of panacea to traditional utility maximization equilibrium theorizing.

The problem with this being is that in general, finding a Nash equilibrium is an NP-hard problem. Norms are the primary target of nudges, the authors describe, but nudging is really about manipulating decision-making heuristics.

Often they choose based on some set of heuristics. In Parts 3 and 4, Colander and Kupers suggest that while governance structures are created from the bottom-up, these bottom-up structures are somehow free of the apparent behavioral flaws of the individuals whose decisions led to the emergence of these governance structures.

To suggest that one the private individual is driven by self-gain while the other the public chooser is driven by social welfare ignores how most governance structures have traditionally arose.

It also ignores the numerous non-governance organizations that arose to promote social welfare throughout history. They do not examine why fraternal and other charitable organizations vanished in the first place, instead leaning on their implicit assumption throughout the book of an almost Pigovian-like market failure theory of private lock-in due to suboptimal norms and individual decision-making heuristics.

More egregious than their academic oversights and ideological biases, however, is their waving-away of economic truths that are true regardless of the complexity of the social system.

The primary truth ignored is the recognition that resources arrogated to government have alternative uses in the private sphere. How officials are able to calculate which methods will jolt society in which direction, and what the more optimal basin of attraction is, remains a mystery unexplained in this text.

I saw little indication of new theory in the book. Most of what I saw was an attempt to re-package Pigovian social welfare theory and utilitarianism in complex systems theoretical trappings.

I enjoyed the introduction of complexity ideas to the realm of public policy-making. My main problem with the text is that although it rejects the ideas of equilibrium theory and Pigovian welfare economics in a traditional sense it fully embraces them in a modern sense, without an acknowledgment of why rejection of one does not imply the rejection of both.

It discards in large part the power and insight of complex systems theory, and does not challenge the policy-making status quo nearly as heartily as it deserves.

For more on this, see my post. Standard macro theory is a linear aggregation of axiomatic math-based micro theory. Its descriptive power suffers from both its presumed linearity and its roots in axiomatic math.

But that might not be the real issue. The real issue may be that students are not instructed on how problematic a linear, axiomatic macro might be to the descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive powers of their models.

My question, on the back of Prof. The prevalence, indeed, the routine nature of nonlinearity and feedback effects in social dynamics would seem to preclude a linear aggregation of presumptive equilibriating micro states.

Given the likelihood of undecidabilities at more complex levels like the social level, standard macro methodology has two big strikes against it.

There are more strikes against standard macro methodology in the form of blatantly ignoring non-trivial fundamentalities of social systems, such that actors are not homogeneous and social networks matter, to name a few.

A con, that only works given fundamentally wrong assumptions about human behavior and emergent social behavior from the interaction of many individuals.

So, again: what would a conless macroeconomics look like? Methodological thinkers in economics usually translate decision theory as it pertains to economic decisions as choice theory, that is, rational choice theory.

Choice theory as the decision theory of economic individuals is widespread and almost never questioned by practitioners of the science.

In their first and second year foundational courses graduate students are rarely exposed to caveats to traditional choice theory, except perhaps a chapter or two on Thalerian behavioral economics and the results of economic experiments of the type pioneered by Vernon Smith.

Real analysis is ever and always the formalism of choice theory and of the interactions between economic individuals.

The edgiest of departures from midth century rational choice theory still rely on reliable heuristics, partial optimization, or alternative learning methods to arrive at decisions.

Note that much of my analysis draws from the discoveries of scientists working in the field of computational complexity.

I will refer to a few here, but a general reading is encouraged. The 20 th century crowd is comprised of mostly mathematicians and computer scientists, namely, Kurt Gödel, Alan Turing, Stephen Wolfram.

Two of the spokespeople for the 21 st century crowd are the mathematical economist V. Velupillai and the computer scientist Gregory Chaitin, though others and notably several Austrian economists have their head in this game.

It is important to understand, going forward, that the social systems studied by economists are complex systems. That is, in order to get an accurate solution to any given problem our model must be as complex as the economic process it is attempting to emulate.

The very reason we build models is to reduce a complex process into manageable parts; the PCE implies that complex-enough systems are not coherently reducible to some interacting set of component parts.

This feature of any complex-enough system is called computational irreducibility. Social systems are computationally irreducible.

The mathematics underlying real analysis are called axiomatic mathematics. Axiomatic mathematics takes a small set of axioms, then, by virtue of deduction, derives a large amount of implications.

Axiomatic mathematics relies on proof theory to conduct its derivations, and proof theory relies on the unbreakability of the law of the excluded middle LEM.

All derivations of mathematical realities are based on the unbreakability of the LEM. Any theory based on axiomatic mathematics wherein the LEM does not hold is called an inconsistent theory, in that the theory in some way contradicts itself.

The implications of inconsistent theories are unprovable, and their predictions, meaningless. In , Kurt Gödel, an Austrian mathematician who was friends with Oskar Morgenstern, proved that there exist true propositions that can be neither verified or falsified by axiomatic mathematics.

These propositions violate the law of the excluded middle. But it is true that the statement is false so says the statement itself.

That is, both the statement and its negation are true, and we have unearthed an inconsistency. Both comparative statics and general equilibrium theory have been shown to have pathological behavior, such that we are faced with either undecidable propositions, non-computability of solutions, or both.

Velupillai reviews the formal underpinnings of general equilibrium theory as formulated by Debreu and describes how, when faced with the need to depart from axiomatic mathematics and develop theories in the realm of constructive mathematics where the LEM does not hold and thus undecidabilities can be taken into account rigorously, several of the theorems that underlie the proof of existence of a general equilibrium as formulated by Debreu are invalid Velupillai, , p.

To put it more plainly, the axiom system of traditional mathematics is not sufficient to derive the existence of general equilibrium as formulated by Debreu.

Choice theory rests on several presumptions, a few of which are 1 existence, completeness, and transitivity of preferences, 2 revealed preferences, 3 the existence, continuity, and uniqueness of a utility relation between preferences and the set of the reals — that is, a cardinalization of the ordinal, complete, and transitive set of preferences.

Kreps, Given these assumptions, maxima in the case of individual utility and minima in the case of costs, exist, and are unique. The completeness — or analytical closedness — of decision theory is a necessary condition for solutions to exist.

An incomplete decision theory is one which contains undecidable propositions. Choice theory and its conclusions are consistent only if its axioms hold, including the axiom whereby solutions maxima and minima are proved to exist, and to be unique.

Similarly, for social choice theory, equilibria must exist, and be unique. Morgenstern believed that game theory and its panoply of strategies might serve as a more rigorous replacement of comparative statics.

Morgenstern was correct in that the calculability of solutions of linear programming problems on the scale necessary to be consistent with the sheer number of variables in realistic economic problems was an issue.

But are game theoretic solutions, like Nash equilibria, any more calculable? And what about undecidable problems in comparative statics and game theory?

Take the linear programming methodology, wherein economists solve traditional problems in comparative statics in a large number of variables, in order to, for instance, calculate equilibrium price vectors.

When it comes to employing the linear programming methodology, the more realism we inject into our model, the more variables we need to include.

But it is quite possible that any algorithm we develop to realistically represent a price vector using linear programming methods would never halt, that is, the price vector itself would be non-calculable.

Morgenstern was, understandably, married to game theory as the future of mathematical economics. Is game theory an analytical way out of the general equilibrium theory briar patch?

All economics built on real analysis foundations — that is to say, all of mathematical economics — fails the same test.

Why are the shaky foundations of traditional mathematical economics relatively unknown to economic scholars, who typically learn to prove a set is compact their first year in graduate school, if not earlier?

The need for social science scholars and those they advise to have some sense of control over social outcomes is another point that, while related, is out of the scope of this discussion.

What, then, is the way forward? Constructive mathematics is differentiated from traditional axiomatic mathematics in that it does not require the law of the excluded middle to be satisfied by any given proposition.

Bishop-style constructive mathematics, for instance, requires that all existence proofs be constructive in that they can be implemented at least in principle on a computer.

That is, an object is said to exist only if it can be physically constructed and demonstrated. Functions, in constructive mathematics, are implementable algorithms, whose definition depends on how they must be implemented in code.

The procedural construction of the empirical patterns we recognize in our own social outcomes may be the beginning of a way towards a more rigorous development of economic theory.

Borrill, P.

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